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Preface
This MAS practice aid is one in a series intended to assist practitioners in
applying their knowledge of organizational functions and technical disciplines
in the course of providing management advisory services. Although these
practice aids often deal with aspects of MAS knowledge in the context of an
MAS engagement, they are also intended to be useful to practitioners who
provide advice on the same subjects in the form of an MAS consultation. MAS
engagements and consultations are defined in Statement on Standards for
Management Advisory Services (SSMAS) No. 1, issued by the AlCPA.
This series of MAS practice aids should be particularly helpful to practi
tioners who use the technical expertise of others while remaining responsible
for the work performed. It may also prove useful to members in industry and
government in providing advice and assistance to management.
MAS technical consulting practice aids do not purport to include every
thing a practitioner needs to know or do to undertake a specific type of service.
Furthermore, engagement circumstances differ, and, therefore, the practitioner’s
professional judgment may cause him or her to conclude that an approach
described in a particular practice aid is not appropriate.
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Scope of This Practice Aid
Security has always been an area of concern in a business. A key responsibility
of management is to safeguard the assets of the business, which include
computerized accounting records and other information. If computerized data
is lost and unrecoverable, changed by unauthorized persons, or stolen and
used by a competitor, the business’s risk of financial loss increases.
The investment in computing resources for both hard and soft costs is
significant. The hard costs include the purchase price of microcomputers and
peripherals (for example, printers, tape drives, and scanners); the soft costs
include those associated with training personnel, implementing the system,
and developing backup and recovery procedures.
Microcomputers perform a variety of functions, some of which were
previously performed exclusively on minicomputers and mainframes or on
dedicated computing equipment (for example, word processors and
CAD/CAM equipment). The result of this shift is often a decentralization of
information processing and total independence from a company’s primary
computer system.
Although microcomputers offer a flexible processing environment, they
pose potential problems for a business’s traditional control systems, which
management usually oversees within a normal organizational structure. But
functions performed on microcomputers may not be integrated into the
company’s internal control system. Additionally, microcomputers may increase
rather than decrease the concentration of duties within a functional area,
making control procedures more difficult to implement. Consequently,
microcomputer security is a concern to all businesses.
This practice aid provides practitioners with an overview of a microcom
puter security-review engagement. It may also help practitioners and members
in industry (1) understand the work of computer security experts and other
personnel assigned to the project and (2) develop policies and procedures for
internal operations involving microcomputer resources.
This practice aid focuses solely on microcomputer security. Although there
may be some similarities in security issues for microcomputers, minicom
puters, and mainframes, the microcomputer introduces a special set of
security problems to business management and the practitioner. These
problems are presented here as they relate to the single-user microcomputer,
microcomputers in a local area network (LAN), and microcomputers com
municating with other microcomputers or larger-scale processing systems.
This practice aid does not address the issues involved or the methods by
which security may be studied and evaluated when an audit of financial state
ments is being performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards.
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Typical Engagements
Ideally, a practitioner assists a client in instituting microcomputer security
procedures when a client introduces microcomputers into the workplace. The
practitioner may have the opportunity to recommend improvements in proce
dures over time. More commonly, though, a microcomputer security review
occurs when a problem arises. The following situations are examples of when
a microcomputer security review or related projects are applicable:
• Initial system purchase. When initially considering a microcomputer, the
client may involve the practitioner in the acquisition decision or with related
issues. This is the opportune time to discuss security options and establish
workable policies and procedures.
• Deficiencies detected during an audit. An auditor’s examination of internal
accounting controls can reveal inadequacies in the data processing
environment, including issues of system backup and recovery, access to
the computer, the functioning of systems, and segregation of duties.
• Loss of data files. When significant data files are lost due to absent or
inadequate backup and recovery procedures, a client may want to prevent
the loss from occurring again.
• Suspected theft or misuse of data. Possible employee theft of information
or unauthorized access to the system can significantly increase interest in
tightening controls over the system.
• Increased access to or from other computing systems. Introduction of
telecommunications with other systems or expanded access to the client’s
microcomputer may initiate questions such as: Who can have access?
What functions can be performed? Is the user authorized to perform the
function?
• Expansion of microcomputer use. As more microcomputers are used, net
worked together, or interfaced with other systems, the client may require
new or revised policies and procedures and hardware or software capabil
ities to address the security needs of the company.
• Personnel turnover. Changes in personnel may require additional training
in proper security procedures. The practitioner may be called on to pro
vide continuity of knowledge between a business’s various systems and to
familiarize new employees with the systems in use.

Engagement Acceptance Criteria
The practitioner determines the level of technical skill required to properly
address the client’s needs. For instance, the skill necessary to handle a single2

user microcomputer is much less than that needed for a multiple-workstation
LAN. If the practitioner does not have all the required skills, then technical
specialists may be called on when necessary.
The client needs to appreciate the value of reasonable security policies
and procedures governing the use of microcomputers. Without manage
ment’s support, operating personnel may not fully implement or comply with
recommended security practices. Consequently, the practitioner discusses
with management the issues involved in securing compliance. The practitioner
conveys the cost-benefit value of various security alternatives so that the
appropriate mix of security practices can be implemented.

Engagement Objectives and Benefits
The objectives of a microcomputer security review are to—
1. Determine the organizational environment in which the microcomputers
are used, in terms of supervisory, technical, and operational personnel.
2. Establish who has access to the computer system, its applications, and its
data files, for what functions, and from which locations.
3. Determine to what extent backup and recovery procedures are used and
are necessary.
4. Identify security policies and procedures and how to monitor compliance
with them.
Typically, the small business environment does not allow for adequate
segregation of duties among individuals and functions; using microcomputers
can further concentrate those duties. Consequently, traditional control
approaches for larger data processing environments may not be practical
when applied to microcomputers.
Since the client may not possess data processing expertise, the practi
tioner is an important technical resource—someone who is familiar with the
business and its security needs. The engagement provides management with
security recommendations that are practical and beneficial to the way in which
the company does business. The benefits resulting from such an engagement
may include—
• Increased control over the functions performed with microcomputers.
• User accountability by functional area, as well as restrictions preventing
unauthorized persons from gaining access to certain applications.
• Improved ability to recover software and data files through formal backup
and recovery procedures.
• Protection of equipment, software, and data from theft or other forms of
loss.
• Limitations on exposure to loss of sensitive company information.
3

Engagement Approach
Reaching an Understanding With the Client
To achieve a successful microcomputer security-review engagement, both the
practitioner and client need to understand (1) the client’s security require
ments, (2) the security problems that have occurred in the past, (3) the extent
of the security review desired, and (4) the margin of risk within which the client
is willing to operate.
The review can include assessing security throughout the general work
environment. This means evaluating the physical location and access to
microcomputers as well as the organization of the entire system. The review
can also evaluate the security of operating and application systems, perhaps
emphasizing more complex operating environments, such as local area net
works (LANs) or microcomputers interfaced with larger-scale processing sys
tems (minicomputers or mainframe computers).
The engagement letter needs to state the basic facts of the engagement.
Exhibit 1, “ Engagement Letter,” includes some of these considerations and
indicates the intended use of a specialist.

Planning for the Review
Depending on the complexity of microcomputer use in the client’s operations,
the time required to perform the review may vary. As in any engagement, the
practitioner plans the activities before beginning fieldwork in the client’s facili
ties. The practitioner may find it beneficial either to conduct a survey or ask the
client to complete the Microcomputer Information Survey (exhibit 2).
The survey documents the specific hardware (by physical location) and the
software systems in use. It helps the practitioner determine the applications
performed on the hardware, identify any telecommunications activities with
remote systems or databases, and understand the organizational structure in
which the microcomputer resources are used and the specific responsibilities
of the personnel involved.
Having collected this information, the practitioner begins to identify the
security exposure areas, to plan the approach to the remainder of the review,
and to determine if his or her staff has sufficient skills to conduct the engage
ment. Through additional research, the practitioner can determine the security
capabilities of the client’s hardware and software systems. Lastly, the research
indicates to what extent the client currently employs any available security
features of the equipment and software.

Assessing the Security Risks
Security risks are present in virtually every processing system, whether manual
or automated. To determine how much security is needed, the practitioner
4

may use a standard work program. (See exhibit 3, “ Microcomputer Security
Work Program,’’ which identifies risk areas to assess.) The work program is a
framework for the review from which additional investigations may be initiated,
depending on the extent and complexity of the client’s operations. From this
assessment, the practitioner can determine not only risks, but also appropriate
counterbalancing measures.
Security factors can be divided into eight categories:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Organizational structure
Physical access to equipment
Physical environment
User authentication
Software and data files
Backup and recovery policies
Sensitive information
General policies

Organizational structure. Large organizations have a greater opportunity to
segregate functional responsibilities and cross-train staff. Small businesses
may concentrate many duties in only one or a few persons, risking a lapse in
business operations if key personnel are absent and a greater chance of errors
(unintentional or intentional) and omissions. In small business settings, there
fore, the involvement and computer knowledge of owner-management may
be an important control consideration.
Whether the operation is large or small, management needs to be sensitive
to the technical competence of its microcomputer users. Are they likely to
wander into “ foreign” areas of the system and make unintentional mistakes?
Could they recognize the possibility of deleting a file? Would they accidentally
overwrite a file?
The practitioner needs to determine the degree to which employees’
access to computing functions is consistent with assigned jobs. Employees
with responsibilities for creating and maintaining data demand access to the
corresponding functions in a system, whereas those with a need only to view
information should not be able to initiate or modify transactions.
The practitioner also needs to assess the employees’ attitudes. Are they
disgruntled because of poorly defined functions or inadequate compensa
tion? Has there been abnormally high employee turnover? Would they attempt
to deliberately destroy data files or equipment? Would they access sensitive
information files without authorization?
The financial exposure of the business requires consideration as well.
Could a financially and technically savvy employee alter records through the
computer, use it to steal funds, or cover up any other actions taken? What is the
company’s operational dependence on its microcomputers? What happens if
the computers go down? Can operations be performed by manual accounting
processes? Are there other processing alternatives?
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The practitioner evaluates the manner in which management views these
problems. Depending on current facts or possible exposure, the practitioner
suggests procedures to counteract these risks.
Physical access to equipment. Because a microcomputer is a relatively small
workstation in or close to an employee’s work area, it may be difficult to physi
cally isolate the machine. Measures that can limit physical access include the
following:
• Use locking devices provided by the manufacturer.
• Secure the equipment to the work area so that it can’t be removed.
• Limit physical access to the work area and visibility by the public.
• For LANs, place the file server in a locked area with limited access.
• Protect paper stock (including negotiable items, such as checks) and
magnetic media resources when the microcomputer is unattended.
• Use diskless microcomputers to prevent extraction of files from LANs. This
prevents a user from downloading files or data to a workstation.
Because most hardware systems are readily available, microcomputer
hardware components can be replaced quickly. However, certain specialized
hardware is best kept at another processing site. The practitioner identifies
which equipment is most essential to a client’s operations, evaluates the time
needed to replace it, and sets up a system to expedite replacement. This infor
mation can be documented in the company’s backup and recovery policy.
Physical environment. The location of microcomputers in a client’s facility
may expose the equipment and any data kept with it to environmental risks,
such as corrosive materials, dirt or dust, excessive vibrations from nearby
manufacturing processes, and power surges. Security measures can mini
mize environmental risks. Such measures include protective enclosures or
covers for hardware and surge protectors or uninterruptible power supplies
(UPSs). However, conditions in some client environments may be so poor that
data backup is the only option available to ensure continuity of operations.
User authentication. Only those individuals authorized by company manage
ment to use the system and its information should have access to it. Authoriza
tion can occur at four levels—operating system, application system, program,
and file—and is usually controlled by using a password. To be effective,
passwords should be limited to those persons who need access to a particular
function. The password can even limit access to one part of an application if
that is all that is necessary.
The practitioner assesses the current password structure at each level,
considering the following:
• How are the passwords managed? In a small operation, the owner may
assign passwords: in a large business, a security manager or a system
6

administrator may either assign passwords or ensure that users select and
control their own passwords.
• What is the password structure? Are passwords at different system levels
sufficiently unique? Are they shared in any manner? Are they changed
periodically, either by the security manager or automatically by the system?
With more complex microcomputer installations, such as a LAN, the oper
ating system may use passwords to provide extensive security throughout the
system. These passwords can regulate which hardware devices are opened
for use as well as the directories that may be entered. But this procedure is not
limited to LANs. Even a single-user system can have a system monitor to deter
mine who is using the system, which files and programs are being accessed,
and when an activity occurs. The information can be reported periodically on
an audit log. When an audit log exists, an appropriate person, such as the
system manager, reviews the log on a regular basis and investigates any
unusual entries.
A call-back approach is an appropriate security procedure for remotesystem access to or from a microcomputer. It requires a call back to an autho
rized telephone number before allowing a user access at an off-premises site.
Otherwise, either software security or manual measures must be developed
to assure that only authorized users can access the system from remote
locations.
For especially sensitive situations, passwords can be combined with some
form of hardware, such as an access card, to further identify a user. Even
biometric security techniques, which identify a person based on fingerprint or
retinal (eye) comparison, can be used. However, these techniques are costly
and are not yet perfected.
Software and data files. Various ways to access operating and application
systems exist. For instance, menus create a common, easy-to-use interface to
application programs and limit the user’s activities to the choices offered. At
the same time, a menu or other front-end system eliminates employee contact
with the operating system.
Because the operating system is usually easy to access and vulnerable to
user error, the practitioner may advise the client to remove certain functions,
such as the FORMAT command, which can erase an entire hard disk or other
disk magnetic media. This and other system utilities that enable a user to
modify files are best controlled by the system manager. Another method of
securing sensitive operating-system functions is to create a hidden file, which
allows access to certain functions but does not list them on the system
directory.
Many applications systems, such as integrated accounting systems,
spreadsheets, word processing, and databases, have at least a minimal level
of program and file security. LAN-based application systems should have
record-locking capabilities to maintain record integrity. The practitioner con
siders how to secure these applications by using the existing protection and
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encryption tools provided with the program software. Possible measures
include the following:
• Restrict physical access to the file or media.
• Prevent text, data, or computation changes to the file contents (the records
or work fields) by using existing application and operating system features
that make the information read-only.
• Ensure that a system exists to properly document each application.
The practitioner establishes a method to control access to data files. By
their very nature, data files may be scattered across the microcomputers in a
business, and their use may not be closely controlled or monitored. Security
problems could cost the company time and effort. Thus, basic procedures
should control access to current versions of software master disks, as well as
other internally developed programs, templates, and sensitive master files and
databases. The practitioner can review documentation to learn about the
client’s library of software resources, including version numbers, latest update,
and authorized users.
Likewise, utility software, which enables the user to perform various func
tions, including the recovery of data files and modification of corrupted files,
should be controlled. In the wrong hands, this type of software can circumvent
existing security schemes and data file protection measures.
Backup and recovery policies. The ability to replace lost or destroyed pro
grams and data files is critical. The practitioner recommends procedures that
enable the client to resume business within a short period of time if computer
resources (hardware, software, or data files) are lost.
All operating system software, application software, and data files should
be backed up. Clients may use tapes or disks to capture and retain information
as it is created or updated. The choice depends on the volume and location
of the files. The frequency of backup may vary, from daily to monthly, based on
the sensitivity of the information and the hardships involved in recreating it.
To avoid losing information through a power surge or power failure, the
client uses equipment such as a surge protector or a UPS. This equipment
either masks irregularities in the electrical supply or gives the client an opportu
nity to power down the system in an organized manner.
Computer viruses in programs, particularly those obtained through elec
tronic bulletin boards or nonretail sources (pirated or public domain software),
can contain instructions to modify an executable program or a series of
programs, including the operating system. These viruses can damage
systems. The client should therefore restrict which programs are stored on
its system. Company policies can limit acquisitions to software purchased
through retail channels (which is unlikely to contain a self-modifying code) and
should prohibit pirating software and installing it on company hardware. Proce
dures should exist to determine that pirated software is not in use. The client
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can also use software that detects viruses or other security breaches. A
business may establish a policy to use only specific application systems
approved by management.
Backup procedures vary, depending on the particular system involved.
Factors to consider include the transaction volume, the frequency of updating
the data, and the company’s retention requirements (need for historical infor
mation).
Backup procedures for microcomputer systems may not seem necessary
to a client. Usually, such procedures aren’t considered until a need for recovery
arises. However, the practitioner evaluates each system and recommends
which backups will remain on-site and which kept off-site. In both cases, the
client needs to secure the backup media in an appropriate fireproof area able
to withstand extreme temperatures.
The practitioner also determines to what extent the company has tested the
backup and recovery policies and procedures. A review of the client’s testing
approach and results will provide evidence of the company’s ability to recover
from a disaster.
Sensitive information. Some companies process highly sensitive information
on a microcomputer system. For such processing, a removable hard disk,
which can be locked up when not in use, is a good option.
Encryption of data files is an additional security option when the client does
not want unauthorized access to certain information. The data file is encrypted
and decrypted at processing time, the only time the information is in a readable
format. Various hardware and software systems encrypt data. Software
encryption programs can be obtained and the encryption algorithm
deciphered. In contrast, hardware encryption devices become inoperative if
tampered with.
Encryption can be used on a system’s password files to prevent someone
from looking through the files and learning the password structure. It can also
be used for transmissions between computers; however, encryption can
decrease a computer’s processing speed.
General policies. An absence of policies and procedures can promote secu
rity problems. Documentation can provide the security rules governing the
system as well as other standards to ensure that microcomputer use is as
consistent as possible. All employees should be familiar with these policies.
Sensitive items, such as password lists, are best kept in a secured area.
Copies of all system and user documentation are kept in a secured area apart
from where day-to-day business activities are conducted. Policies to ensure
continuity of operations include cross-training personnel in several functions
and requiring specified vacation policies.

Determining the Client’s Risk Level
Determining a client’s risk threshold may not be easy. The determination is a
combination of estimates, including the nature of the operations, possible
9

financial exposure, the type and quality of employees, and the degree to which
management is involved in day-to-day activities (including computerized oper
ations). By calling the client’s attention to potential problems and offering a
range of acceptable solutions, with the cost-benefit relationship of each, the
practitioner can focus on the risk level and appropriate security solutions.
Exhibit 4, “ Security Risk Matrix,’’ illustrates some of the risks that may be
uncovered in a microcomputer security review. It relates the risk exposure to
the control category normally affected, with a typical control response shown
to address the risk.

Engagement Outputs
The engagement output from the review will include the final report, which
details observations regarding security and presents recommended actions to
secure the microcomputer environment. The report may describe security
risks that the client is presently unwilling to change so that there will be a record
that security risks exist and may result in some future business exposure.
Depending on the results of the engagement, follow-up projects may be
warranted. These can include the following:
• Develop policies and procedures for microcomputer use.
• Evaluate specific products that may be acquired to correct security
deficiencies.
• Train client personnel to use security features in the existing systems.
• Develop tests to determine compliance with security policies and
procedures.
• Establish a disaster recovery plan, especially for larger processing
environments.

Implementation Assistance
and Follow-up
Having undergone a microcomputer security review, the client will likely want
to ensure that recommendations are implemented and complied with over
time. The practitioner formulates an implementation plan with management
and participates, as much as possible, in implementing the recommendations.
After implementing the recommendations, the client may wish to consider
a postimplementation review to verify the results. The client may choose to
perform periodic checkups of compliance with the security policies and
procedures.
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Marketing a Microcomputer
Security Review
With the broad use of microcomputers in all companies, there are many
opportunities to provide a security review service. The initial opportunity often
results when a client has lost data files and lacks backup. But for all aspects of
business exposure, the practitioner needs to raise the awareness of clients and
professional staff members alike and stress their being alert to warning signs
of improper security measures.
Observations of security deficiencies made during an audit, management
advisory service, or tax service can lead to engagements. A client’s decision
to buy new computers or replace an existing system is a clear signal to
reexamine and possibly revise security controls. If a client moves the location
of its computing operations, organizational changes may result. Such a move
can imply further decentralization of computing operations and increased
security risk.
The security of a client’s operation is the practitioner’s continuing concern.
The practitioner considers risk exposures for microcomputer resources on an
ongoing basis.

11

APPENDIX

Sample Forms
Exhibit 1

Engagement Letter
CPA & Company
Anytown, USA 00000
January 1, 19XX
Mr. Robert Jones
ABC Company
100 Main Street
Anytown, USA 00000
Dear Mr. Jones;
This letter confirms our understanding that CPA & Company will assist you in
performing a microcomputer security review of your operations. Our engagement will
consist of the following:
1. We will review your microcomputer configuration and application systems to
evaluate your current security environment.
2. Based on our review, we will recommend security measures that you may
implement.
Because your company uses a local area network (LAN), we have engaged a LAN
specialist to assist us with LAN security considerations.
We base our fees on time expended at our standard rate. We will bill you monthly
for the work performed. Payment is due on receipt.
Please signify your acceptance of these terms by signing this letter and returning
one copy to us.
Sincerely,

CPA & Company
Accepted by____

Date_
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Exhibit 2

Microcomputer Information Survey
1.

Organization
a.

Name of company

b.

Division names or
locations_______

c. Location of EDP if any
Senior EDP representative.
d. Attach a corporate and EDP organizational chart.
Equipment Configuration(s)
Description Quantity Manufacturer Model Communications* LAN* Location
File server
C

P U

_________________________________________________________

Memory
size

_______ ___________ _____ _______________ ____ _______

Disk
size

_______ ___________ _____ _______________ ____ _______

Tape
b a c k u p ___________________ ______ _______________ ____ _______
(Where a LAN is used, describe the topology scheme. Provide a diagram of the
equipment used [wiring paths, terminals, printers, communication interfaces,
and so on].)
Personal computers
C P U _________________________________________________________

Use a Y for yes if COM (communications) and LAN (on a network) are the case.
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(Describe the general characteristics of each workstation in use in terms of
memory size, disk capacity, and so on.)
Description Quantity Manufacturer Model Communications LAN Location

3.

Printer

_______ ___________

_____ ______________

___

_______

Other

_______ ___________

_____ ______________

___

_______

Software
Manufacturer

Name

Version

File server

___________

_____

______

Workstation

___________

_____

______

Spreadsheet

___________

_____

______

Database

___________

_____

______

Word processing

___________

_____

______

Application 1

___________

_____

______

Application 2

___________

_____

______

Application 3

___________

_____

______

Application 4

___________

_____

______

Telecommunications

___________

_____

______

Other

___________

_____

______

Operating system

Application systems

Accounting

(Provide diagrams of the applications used.)
4.

Remote Databases
a. List all remote public and corporate databases used.
b. Identify any internal databases (or other applications) that outside users may
interact with via telecommunications.
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Exhibit 3

Microcomputer Security Work Program
Organization and Administration
1.

Within the organizational structure of the company, describe the person(s)
responsible for general as well as microcomputer security. If a LAN is used, who
serves as the network security officer?

2.

Obtain all documentation on policies regarding security of data processing
activities. If an EDP department exists, describe its relationship to microcomputer
use in the company. Does it set policies and procedures for microcomputer
acquisition, use, and security?

3.

Describe the extent of custom programming for microcomputer systems. Is such
programming done internally or contracted out to a consulting group?

4.

What policies exist, if any, for the acquisition of packaged software systems? Are
there approval requirements for such purchases?

5.

Is a contingency plan for processing in place, or is one justified based on the
client circumstances?

6.

Are copies of critical software, data tiles, templates, and documentation stored
off-site or in another acceptable location?

Operations— Processing Procedures
1.

For transaction-processing systems, describe the procedures for user authoriza
tion (by application) on workstations. Who is responsible for determining work
assignments and monitoring assignment completion?

2.

Describe the password authorization system for—
a. File server access.
b. Application access (by task within each application).

3.

Determine specific measures taken to secure key data files (by application) from
unauthorized modification.

4.

Determine that utility software exists for a variety of functions, such as restoring
data from lost files, master files, or transaction files.

5.

Identify other applications exposure areas that warrant security treatment.

Operations— Nontransaction-oriented Systems
1.

Identify the other microcomputer-based applications that are not routinely
processed, for example, spreadsheets, databases, and so on.

2.

Describe the control procedures used to document, test, and retain these appli
cations as a permanent record. Who is responsible for securing this information?
Is off-site storage (separate from the end user) used?

3.

Describe the password authorization procedures for these applications.

Access Controls— Hardware
1.

Is there a physical inventory of all equipment used (including serial numbers)?

2.

Are manufacturer’s security locks used? Are keys stored under an adequate
control procedure?
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3.

If a LAN is used, is physical access to the file server adequately controlled?

4.

Is the workstation equipment adequately secured? Is access to work areas
adequately controlled?

5.

Are disks and other magnetic media secured to prevent unauthorized use?

Access Controls— Other
1.

What security procedures exist to prevent unauthorized access to telecommuni
cations? Is the access restricted during nonbusiness hours?

2.

Are activities automatically logged according to type, time, and initiator?

3.

Describe existing backup and recovery procedures. Has the company tested
these procedures?

4.

Describe the process for changing security access to microcomputer systems
after someone has been terminated.

5.

Describe the policy for password rotation.
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2. Understaffing
or terminations

b. Magnetic media

a. Hardware

1. Vandalism or
theft of

Rotate job respon
sibilities. Ownermanagement has
direct involvement
in training.

Segregation
of
_______ Risk______________ Functions

Authorization
of
____ Transactions

Integrity
of
Information

Security Risk Matrix

Use well-supported
systems. Use ven
dor training and
support as key
selection criteria.

Maintain backup.
Keep copies off-site
in fireproof, lockable
storage under
restricted control.

If complex environ
ment, consider
alternate site
arrangement; if
feasible, establish
contingency plan,
including expedited
purchase and
delivery
arrangements.

Physically secure
equipment in work
area. Inhibit or lock
entry to computer
and components
(boards, switches,
chips, etc.).

Maintain backup.
Keep copies off-site
(or on-site in fire
proof, lockable
storage) under
restricted control.

Continuity
of
Operations

Safeguarding
of
Assets

Exhibit 4
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Use password con
trol at system,
application, and
task levels. Applica
tion controls are
mandatory.

b. Unintentional

Monitor system log
for unauthorized
access. Use pass
word control at each
operating level. If
LAN environment,
restrict directories
accessible to users
based on autho
rized activities.
Back up

(continued)

Back up
At minimum, use
password control at
system level and at
all levels if possible.

4. Errors or omissions

a. Intentional

Document and
retain up-to-date
copies of systems
developed in-house,
templates, data
bases, etc. Keep
copies off-site (or
on-site in fireproof,
lockable storage)
under restricted
access. Require
that purchased
packages meet
minimum documen
tation standards.

3. Lack of docu
mentation

20

Use password con
trols by job
function.

T Access by un
authorized users

3. Introduction of
viruses to software
and data files

Use access control
at each operating
level.

3. Corruption or
destruction of data
files

3. Loss of data due to
system problems

Maintain policy
restricting what
information can be
put on the system
and by what
sources. Obtain
antiviral software to
check new and
existing software for
viruses. Maintain
strict control over
master disks.

Use password
controls for
individuals.

(See Segregation of
Functions.)

Limit physical
access by using
restraint key locks.

Encrypt passwords
and files of sensi
tive applications.
Use passwords
and hardware
cards that restrict
access.

Maintain b a c k u p periodic, from
monthly to daily, or
more frequently on
sensitive data files.

Back up all sensi
tive software and
data files and con
trol access to the
backup.

Maintain off-site
storage of data
files.

Segregation
Authorization
Integrity
Safeguarding
Continuity
of
of
of
of
of
______ Risk______________ Functions__________ Transactions_________ Information____________ Assets____________ Operations

Security Risk Matrix (Continued)
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Install uninterrupt
ible power supply
(UPS) and surge
protectors. Have
redundant backup.
Maintain contrac
tual arrangements
dealing with soft
ware source code
and documentation
under escrowing
arrangements.

11. Loss of electrical
power

12. Custom systems
go out of
business

Note: This matrix does not contain all risks associated with microcomputer use.

Institute contin
gency planning.

Place restrictions
on transportable
files (magnetic
media). Encrypt
highly sensitive
information.

10. Loss of real-time
systems

9. Breach of con
fidentiality of
information

Glossary
application system
A specific task-oriented system comprising numerous pro
grams (for example, general ledger and accounts payable).
authentication
The process of determining if the user trying to enter a particular
system, program, or other device is authorized to do so.
call-back approach
An authenticating procedure used in telecommunication that
calls back the user once a request to use a system is made. This ensures that the user
is working on an authorized hardware device or is in an authorized physical location.
directory

A list of files (programs and data) stored on a hard or floppy disk.

electronic bulletin board
Computer-based information, in the form of programs
and files, that remote users can access via telecommunications.
encryption
Using special algorithms to secure data (programs, data files, pass
words) by scrambling it.
executable program

A program that is in machine-readable form.

file server
A computer on a network that acts as a host to nodes on a LAN. The
server handles file management, input/output control, and network security.
local area network (LAN)

A system of multiple, interconnected electronic devices.

menu
User options, representing actions, that are displayed at the beginning of a
program. Selecting a particular action initiates the next step in a program .
microcom puter

A small stand-alone computer built around a microprocessor.

minicomputer
A general-purpose computer similar to a mainframe computer in
function, but with memory and speed between that of a microcomputer and a
mainframe.
network
sharing.

A connection between two or more computers that allows information

operating system
Software that controls the execution of programs and that may
provide other system-management facilities, such as scheduling, input/output con
trol, disk storage management, and related services.
password
A key word or number code, known only to the authorized user, that
permits access to programs and files.
surge protector
A device that detects irregular electrical patterns to prevent
damage to a computer.
system administrator
The person responsible for maintaining the computer
system, including hardware and software assignments, updates, and problems.
telecom m unications
The process of transmitting information between separate
facilities by electrical, optical, or acoustical means.
topology
The arrangement of pathways in a network (for example, rings, in which
messages pass through stations in turn; stars, in which messages pass through a
central node; and buses, in which each message is presented to all nodes).
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uninterruptible power supply (UPS)
A device that maintains electrical current
for a predetermined period of time. It allows continuing operations or sufficient time for
the user to power down until normal electrical supplies are restored.
virus
An unauthorized program that enters a computer system and damages
operating or application systems.
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MAS PRACTICE AIDS
MAS Small Business Consulting Practice Aids Series
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Assisting Small Business Clients in Obtaining Funds
Identifying Client Problems: A Diagnostic Review Technique
Assisting C lie n t in Maximizing Profits: A Diagnostic Approach
Effective Inventory Management for Small Manufacturing Clients
Assisting Clients in Determining Pricing for Manufactured Products
Business Planning
Personal Financial Planning: The Team Approach
Valuation of a Closely Held Business
Diagnosing Management Information Problems
Developing a Budget
Cash Management
Evaluating and Starting a New Business
Assessing Franchise Opportunities
Assisting Professional Clients in Pricing Services Using Budgeting
Techniques

MAS Technical Consulting Practice Aids Series
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

EDP Engagement: Systems Planning and General Design
Financial Model Preparation
Financial Ratio Analysis
EDP Engagement: Software Package Evaluation and Selection
EDP Engagement: Assisting Clients in Software Contract
Negotiations
6 Assisting Clients in the Selection and Implementation of Dedicated
Word Processing Systems
7 Litigation Services
8 Mergers, Acquisitions, and Sales
9 Improving Productivity Through Work Measurement:
A Cooperative Approach
10 EDP Engagement: Implementation of Data Processing Systems
Using Mainframes or Minicomputers
11 Conversion to a Microcomputer-Based Accounting System
12 Assisting Clients in Developing an Employee Handbook
13 Microcomputer Security
1
2
3
4
5

MAS Practice Administration Aids Series
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

1
2
3
4
5

Developing an MAS Engagement Control Program
Cooperative Engagements and Referrals
Written Communication of Results in MAS Engagements
Starting and Developing an MAS Practice
Communicating With Clients About MAS Engagement
Understandings
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